Door Anoniem: "Gebruik" zelf een android crap loze 4G feature phone van Doro.

n China is elk telefoonnummer geregistreerd onder een burgerservicenummer

Door Anoniem: Hoe staat het met de export modellen?

Door Anoniem: Mijn Nokia 5.x telefoon moest ook perse een GPS locatie bij de setup.

Door Anoniem: Hoe staat het met de export modellen?

Finally, we perform a cross-regional analysis and compare the
preinstalled system apps on the Chinese (CN) and Global (e.g.,
EU) Android OS distributions from the same OS developers. We
find that the number of preinstalled third-party apps on CN OS
distributions is 3 to 4 times larger than for the corresponding Global
OS distribution, and that these are given 8 to 10 times as many
permissions as third-party apps in Global distributions, including
many more permissions classed as dangerous.

Door Anoniem:
Uit het abstract (https://arxiv.org/pdf/2302.01890.pdf):

Regional differences take the form of differences in the installed
firmware, e.g., differences between the system apps installed in
the Global/EU vs. CN Android OS distributions. In addition, even
when the same version of system app is installed in the CN and
Global distributions, the app may contain logic that causes it to
behave differently depending on the region, e.g., by checking the
current location. Regarding the latter, by reverse-engineering the
main system apps, we find that mobile devices tend to use locale,
firmware version, IP address and MCC (which identifies the mobile
operator country) to localize their behavior. For example, Xiaomi
maintains a list of URLs in a Java HashMap:
1 {"CN": "data.mistat.xiaomi.com",
2 "INTL": "data.mistat.intl.xiaomi.com",
3 "IN": "data.mistat.india.xiaomi.com"},
and uses a hardcoded value ("CN") and locale together, to select an
endpoint in the Chinese firmware. The preinstalled Amap package
on Realme and OnePlus handsets uses the MCC to determine the
API endpoint:
1 StringBuilder sb = new StringBuilder();
2 if (a2) {
3 sb.append("http://aps.oversea.amap.com/APS/r?ver=5.1&q=0");
4 } else if (z) {
5 sb.append("http://aps.testing.amap.com/APS/r?ver=5.1&q=0");
6 } else if (z2) {
7 sb.append("https://aps.amap.com/APS/r?ver=5.1&q=0");
8 } else {
9 sb.append("http://aps.amap.com/APS/r?ver=5.1&q=0");}
in which a2 is True if MCC does not equal 460 (China).
Although the mobile devices in our study were purchased on the
Chinese market, we do not conduct experiments locally and recog-
nize that the data collected outside China may not fully represent a
device’s behavior in that region. To overcome this issue, we set up a
network tunnel between our campus and a Huawei Cloud instance
in Shanghai. The IP address observed by the backend server is thus
that of the Huawei Cloud server located in Shanghai. We set up
each handset using Chinese as the language to simulate a local user.
With this setup, the only app that we observed still adapting to
the device’s true location was the Amap app. Fortunately, through
reverse-engineering (decrypting/decoding every connection in the
collected traces via mitmproxy and apk decompiling and analysis,
which allows us to examine all the transmitted fields in plaintext)
we confirmed that the contents of the messages transmitted to
Amap’s different API endpoints are the same in all regions, and so
leaves our traffic collection unaffected. We did not find any sys-
tem services or preinstalled applications that use GPS to select an
endpoint

8 CONCLUSION
In this work we study the Chinese version of the Android OS dis-
tributions run by Xiaomi, Realme, and OnePlus handsets. We mea-
sure the network traffic the handsets generate when in-use by a
privacy-aware consumer. We find that these devices come bun-
dled with a number of third-party applications, some of which are
granted dangerous runtime permissions by default without user
consent, and transmit traffic containing a broad range of geoloca-
tion, user-profile and social relationships PII to both phone vendors
and third-party domains, without notifying the user or offering the
choice to opt-out. In contrast, the data shared by the Global version
of the firmware is mostly limited to device-specific information.
Our study therefore highlights major differences in terms of how
privacy provisions are enforced in different regions.

Door Anoniem: China, de volgende natie na de Russische Federatie om volop te kunnen bashen.

Waarom er dan eerst een productieplatform van maken? Is 'het westen' failliet wellicht?